It is generally assumed that political philosophy, as opposed to moral philosophy, should not be too demanding, at the risk of utopianism and sterility. Where individual agents can - and perhaps ought to - demand the best from themselves, political action deals with the problem of others' consent, whose moral virtue and cooperation can never be taken for granted. Hence A Theory of Justice's focus on stability: just social institutions must generate their own support. Likewise, the exclusion of any references to truth in political justifications in Political Liberalism was intended to prevent losing the support of certain metaphysical and religious conceptions. According to David Estlund, these concessions to realism are not problematic in themselves. However, the concession to what we predict (or even know) others will abide by doesn't tell us what ought to be collectively promoted and achieved, even if it is unrealistic. D. Estlund, by distancing himselffrom Rawls, has set out to achieve the latter's initial project in new, uncompromised ways.