The puzzle of scientific disagreement

被引：0

作者：

Cocchiaro, Mariangela Zoe ^{[1
]}

Trpin, Borut ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Jagiellonian Univ, Krakow, Poland

[2] Ludwig Maximilians Univ Munchen, Munich Ctr Math Philosophy, Munich, Germany

[3] Univ Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia

[4] Univ Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2025年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

Scientific disagreement; Conciliationism; Steadfastness; Epistemology; Philosophy of science; EPISTEMOLOGY;

D O I：

10.1007/s13194-025-00662-4

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

Scientists often find themselves in disagreement with their peers, yet continue to hold fast to their views. While Conciliationism, a prominent position in the epistemology of disagreement, condemns such steadfastness as epistemically irrational, philosophers of science often defend it as rationally permissible-indeed, even beneficial for scientific progress. This tension gives rise to what we call the puzzle of scientific disagreement.

引用

页数：21

共 62 条

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