The Decline of Too Big to Fail

被引：0
|
作者：
Berndt, Antje [1 ]
Duffie, Darrell [2 ]
Zhu, Yichao [1 ]
机构：
[1] Australian Natl Univ, Coll Business & Econ, Canberra, Australia
[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2025年 / 115卷 / 03期
关键词：
CAPITAL STRUCTURE; MORAL HAZARD; MARKET DISCIPLINE; CORPORATE-DEBT; BANK BAILOUTS; RISK; MATURITY; SPREAD; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1257/aer.20220846
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170 percent higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of "too big to fail." (G01, G12, G21, G28, G33, H81)
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页码：945 / 974
页数：30
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