Regulatory influence on corporate cash holdings: Minority shareholder activism by regulators

被引:0
作者
Chen, Rongrong [1 ]
Chen, Xiaomeng Charlene [2 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Univ Chem Technol, Sch Econ & Management, 15 Beisanhuan East Rd, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
[2] Macquarie Univ, Macquarie Business Sch, Balaclava Rd, N Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia
关键词
CSISC; Cash holdings; Precautionary motive; Agency motive; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; POLICY UNCERTAINTY; AGENCY COSTS; FIRMS HOLD; GOVERNANCE; DETERMINANTS; INVESTMENT; FLOW; FINANCE; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104105
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Focusing on an exogenous shock to minority investor activism, we investigate the effect of the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a minority shareholder protection mechanism introduced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, on corporate cash holdings. Using a firm-quarter sample of Chinese listed companies from 2015 to 2017, we find that firms increased their cash holdings after CSISC became a minority shareholder. Channel tests and estimates of the cash flow sensitivity of cash reveal that this increase is primarily driven by precautionary motives, as firms prepare for potential financial uncertainties under CSISC's oversight. We further explore the role of governance-related factors-internal control quality, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage-and find that while CSISC's involvement strengthens governance by mitigating agency motives, it maintains a strong precautionary basis for increased cash holdings in response to heightened regulatory monitoring. This research highlights CSISC's critical role in influencing corporate liquidity management and enhancing investor protection in emerging markets.
引用
收藏
页数:15
相关论文
共 75 条
[11]   Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms [J].
Cai, Hongbin ;
Fang, Hanming ;
Xu, Lixin Colin .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2011, 54 (01) :55-78
[12]   Minority shareholders protection and corporate financial leverage: Evidence from a natural experiment in China [J].
Cao, Qingzi ;
Fang, Ming ;
Pan, Yuying .
PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2022, 73
[13]   The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings [J].
Chen, Deqiu ;
Li, Sifei ;
Xiao, Jason Zezhong ;
Zou, Hong .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2014, 27 :384-400
[14]   Misvaluation and the corporate propensity to hold cash [J].
Chen, Hsuan-Chi ;
Chou, Robin K. ;
Lu, Chien-Lin .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2021, 70
[15]   Can minority investor activism promote corporate risk-taking? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China [J].
Chen, Shen ;
Chen, Yuran ;
Zhang, Di ;
Wang, Jinmei .
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2023, 85
[16]  
Chen Y., 2021, Management World, V37, P142
[17]   Minority Shareholders' Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China [J].
Chen, Zhihong ;
Ke, Bin ;
Yang, Zhifeng .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2013, 88 (04) :1211-1238
[18]   Information Asymmetry and Corporate Cash Holdings [J].
Chung, Kee H. ;
Kim, Jang-Chul ;
Kim, Young Sang ;
Zhang, Hao .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2015, 42 (9-10) :1341-1377
[19]   Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings [J].
Claessens, S ;
Djankov, S ;
Fan, JPH ;
Lang, LHP .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2002, 57 (06) :2741-2771
[20]   Economic policy uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from BRIC countries [J].
Demir, Ender ;
Ersan, Oguz .
EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW, 2017, 33 :189-200