Do Institutional Cross-Owners Obstruct Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure? Evidence From China

被引:0
作者
Cui, Xin [1 ,2 ]
Goodell, John W. [3 ]
Liao, Jing [4 ]
Yao, Shouyu [1 ]
Liu, Xutang [5 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[2] Hebei Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Akron, Coll Business, Akron, OH USA
[4] Massey Univ, Sch Econ & Finance, Palmerston North, New Zealand
[5] Qingdao Univ, Sch Econ, Qingdao, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
China; common institutional ownership; environmental information disclosure; litigation risk; private information; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; MARKET COMPETITION; AGENCY PROBLEMS; BOARD GENDER; FIRM-VALUE; GOVERNANCE; INVESTORS; RESPONSIBILITY; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1111/jbfa.12872
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the impact of common institutional ownership (CIO) on environmental information disclosure (EID) within China's unique institutional context. We find that CIO significantly reduces EID in portfolio firms. To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ alternative measures, fixed effects models, entropy balancing, and instrumental variable estimation. Mechanism analysis reveals that the negative impact of CIO on EID is primarily driven by their better access to and preference for private information, as well as concerns about litigation risks. Furthermore, this negative effect is less pronounced in heavily polluting industries, firms participating in mandatory disclosure pilot programs, regions with higher local government attention to environmental issues, and firms with greater QFII ownership. We also investigate the role of state-owned CIO in influencing EID and find that their negative impact is only significant in privately owned firms, not in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Additionally, the influence of state-owned CIO weakens over time as government attention to corporate environmental information intensifies. These findings highlight the positive role of regulatory and governmental efforts in promoting EID.
引用
收藏
页码:1925 / 1955
页数:31
相关论文
共 174 条
[1]   Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders [J].
Agrawal, A ;
Knoeber, CR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1996, 31 (03) :377-397
[2]   Trust, Investment, and Business Contracting [J].
Ang, James S. ;
Cheng, Yingmei ;
Wu, Chaopeng .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 2015, 50 (03) :569-595
[3]  
Anton M, 2025, MANAGE SCI, V71, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.2024.04363, 10.1287/mnsc.2024.04363]
[4]   Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives [J].
Anton, Miguel ;
Ederer, Florian ;
Gine, Mireia ;
Schmalz, Martin .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2023, 131 (05) :1294-1355
[5]   Passive investors, not passive owners [J].
Appel, Ian R. ;
Gormley, Todd A. ;
Keim, Donald B. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2016, 121 (01) :111-141
[6]   Causality redux: The evolution of empirical methods in accounting research and the growth of quasi-experiments [J].
Armstrong, Christopher ;
Kepler, John D. ;
Samuels, Delphine ;
Taylor, Daniel .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2022, 74 (2-3)
[7]   Do common institutional owners' activisms deter tax avoidance? Evidence from an emerging economy [J].
Athira, A. ;
Lukose, P. J. Jijo .
PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 80
[8]   The Big Three and corporate carbon emissions around the world [J].
Azar, Jose ;
Duro, Miguel ;
Kadach, Igor ;
Ormazabal, Gaizka .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2021, 142 (02) :674-696
[9]   Ultimate ownership and bank competition [J].
Azar, Jose ;
Raina, Sahil ;
Schmalz, Martin .
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2022, 51 (01) :227-269
[10]   Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership [J].
Azar, Jose ;
Schmalz, Martin C. ;
Tecu, Isabel .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2018, 73 (04) :1513-1565