A perfectly free God cannot satisfice

To accept divine satisficing is to hold that it is possible for God to choose a worse option over a better one provided that the worse option is "good enough." Divine satisficing plays an important role in certain responses to the problem of evil and problems of divine creation. Here I argue that if God is perfectly free, then divine satisficing is not possible even if it is permissible. To be perfectly free, in the sense intended here, is to be free from all non-rational influences, including desires or preferences not derived simply from the recognition of one's external reasons. An account of divine motivation which allows for brute preferences is thus needed to accommodate divine satisficing. Thus, we should either accept a brute preference model of divine motivation or reject divine satisficing. In Sect. 1 I will give an overview of the debate on divine satisficing. After clarifying the nature of God's reasons in Sect. 2, I will present my main argument that a perfectly free God cannot satisfice in Sect. 3 and introduce a brute preference model of divine action as an alternative to divine perfect freedom in Sect. 4. Finally, in Sect. 5 I discuss how my argument addresses countervailing considerations and the possibility that God does not face a single best option.