How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment

被引：0

作者：

Gill, David ^{[1
]}

Knepper, Zachary ^{[1
]}

Prowse, Victoria ^{[1
]}

Zhou, Junya ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Purdue Univ, Dept Econ, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

[2] UT Dallas, Naveen Jindal Sch Management, Dallas, UT USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2025年 / 149卷

关键词：

Cognitive ability; Judgment; Fluid intelligence; Matrix reasoning; Beauty contest; Strategic sophistication; Level-k; Experiment; Game theory; SITUATIONAL JUDGMENT; GUESSING GAMES; TESTS; VALIDITY; MODELS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.

引用

页码：82 / 95

页数：14