Integral Attack on the Full FUTURE Block Cipher

被引:0
|
作者
Xu, Zeyu [1 ,2 ]
Cui, Jiamin [1 ,2 ]
Hu, Kai [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Wang, Meiqin [1 ,2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Sch Cyber Sci & Technol, Qingdao 266237, Peoples R China
[2] Shandong Univ, Key Lab Cryptol Technol & Informat Secur, Minist Educ, Qingdao 266237, Peoples R China
[3] Nanyang Technol Univ, Sch Phys & Math Sci, Singapore 639798, Singapore
[4] Quan Cheng Lab, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China
来源
TSINGHUA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY | 2025年 / 30卷 / 01期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Ciphers; Vectors; Sparse matrices; Time complexity; Hardware; Costs; Zirconium; symmetric-key; integral attack; division property; FUTURE; DIVISION PROPERTY;
D O I
10.26599/TST.2024.9010007
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
SubCell MixColumn ShiftRow AddRoundKey F24Abstract: FUTURE is a recently proposed lightweight block cipher that achieved a remarkable hardware performance due to careful design decisions. FUTURE is an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-like Substitution- Permutation Network (SPN) with 10 rounds, whose round function consists of four components,. Unlike AES, it is a 64-bit-size block cipher with a 128bit secret key, and the state can be arranged into 16 cells. Therefore, the operations of FUTURE including its S-box is defined over. The previous studies have shown that the integral properties of 4-bit S-boxes are usually weaker than larger- size S-boxes, thus the number of rounds of FUTURE, i.e., 10 rounds only, might be too aggressive to provide enough resistance against integral cryptanalysis. In this paper, we mount the integral cryptanalysis on FUTURE. With state- of-the-art detection techniques, we identify several integral distinguishers of 7 rounds of FUTURE. By extending this 7-round distinguisher by 3 forward rounds, we manage to recover all the 128 bits secret keys from the full FUTURE cipher without the full codebook for the first time. To further achieve better time complexity, we also present a key recovery attack on full FUTURE with full codebook. Both attacks have better time complexity than existing results.
引用
收藏
页码:161 / 170
页数:10
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