Robust Remote Estimation Over Shared Networks in the Presence of Denial-of-Service Attacks

被引:0
作者
Zhang, Xu [1 ]
Vasconcelos, Marcos M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Xidian Univ, Sch Artificial Intelligence, Xian 710126, Peoples R China
[2] Florida State Univ, FAMU FSU Coll Engn, Dept Elect Engn, Tallahassee, FL 32310 USA
关键词
Jamming; Games; Estimation; Robot sensing systems; Receivers; Channel estimation; Transmitters; Denial-of-service attack; Costs; Wireless networks; Denial-of-service (DoS) attack; multiagent systems; Nash equilibrium; remote estimation; shared networks; STATE ESTIMATION; THEORETIC APPROACH; COMMUNICATION;
D O I
10.1109/TAC.2024.3478308
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Networked multiagent systems often communicate information over low-power shared wireless networks in unlicensed spectrum, which are prone to denial-of-service attacks. An instance of this scenario is considered: multiple pairs of agents, each pair consisting of a transmitting sensor and a receiver acting as an estimator, communicate strategically over shared communication networks in the presence of a jammer who may launch a denial-of-service attack in the form of packet collisions. Using the so-called coordinator approach, we cast this problem as a zero-sum game between the coordinator, who jointly optimizes the transmission and estimation policies, and a jammer, who optimizes its probability of performing an attack. We consider two cases: point-to-point channels and large-scale networks with a countably infinite number of sensor-receiver pairs. When the jammer proactively attacks the channel, we find that this game is nonconvex from the coordinator's perspective. However, we construct a saddle point equilibrium solution for any multivariate Gaussian input distribution for the observations despite the lack of convexity. In the case where the jammer is reactive, we obtain a customized algorithm based on sequential convex optimization, which converges swiftly to first-order Nash equilibria. Interestingly, we discovered that when the jammer is reactive, it is often optimal to block the channel even when it knows that the channel is idle to create ambiguity at the receiver.
引用
收藏
页码:2164 / 2179
页数:16
相关论文
共 39 条
[1]   On Optimal Jamming in Strategic Communication [J].
Akyol, Emrah .
2019 IEEE INFORMATION THEORY WORKSHOP (ITW), 2019, :494-498
[2]   Information-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Communication as a Hierarchical Game [J].
Akyol, Emrah ;
Langbort, Cedric ;
Basar, Tamer .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, 2017, 105 (02) :205-218
[3]   Jamming in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty [J].
Altman, Eitan ;
Avrachenkov, Konstantin ;
Garnaev, Andrey .
MOBILE NETWORKS & APPLICATIONS, 2011, 16 (02) :246-254
[4]   Resilience of LTE eNode B against smart jammer in infinite-horizon asymmetric repeated zero-sum game [J].
Aziz, Farhan M. ;
Li, Lichun ;
Shamma, Jeff S. ;
Stuber, Gordon L. .
PHYSICAL COMMUNICATION, 2020, 39
[5]   THE GAUSSIAN TEST CHANNEL WITH AN INTELLIGENT JAMMER [J].
BASAR, T .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, 1983, 29 (01) :152-157
[6]   DoS Attacks on Remote State Estimation With Asymmetric Information [J].
Ding, Kemi ;
Ren, Xiaoqiang ;
Quevedo, Daniel E. ;
Dey, Subhrakanti ;
Shi, Ling .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS, 2019, 6 (02) :653-666
[7]   Stochastic game in remote estimation under DoS attacks [J].
Ding K. ;
Dey S. ;
Quevedo D.E. ;
Shi L. .
IEEE Control Systems Letters, 2017, 1 (01) :146-151
[8]   A multi-channel transmission schedule for remote state estimation under DoS attacks [J].
Ding, Kemi ;
Li, Yuzhe ;
Quevedo, Daniel E. ;
Dey, Subhrakanti ;
Shi, Ling .
AUTOMATICA, 2017, 78 :194-201
[9]  
FACCHINEI F, 2003, FINITE DIMENSIONAL V
[10]   Jamming on Remote Estimation Over Wireless Links Under Faded Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach [J].
Feng, Yu ;
Shou, Yuhang ;
Yu, Xiaotian .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS II-EXPRESS BRIEFS, 2021, 68 (07) :2593-2597