Assessment of Practical Satellite Quantum Key Distribution Architectures for Current and Near-Future Missions

被引:2
作者
Orsucci, Davide [1 ]
Kleinpass, Philipp [1 ]
Meister, Jaspar [2 ]
De Marco, Innocenzo [1 ]
Haeusler, Stefanie [1 ]
Strang, Thomas [1 ]
Walenta, Nino [3 ]
Moll, Florian [1 ]
机构
[1] German Aerosp Ctr DLR, Inst Commun & Nav, Wessling, Germany
[2] German Aerosp Ctr DLR, Inst Satellite Geodesy & Inertial Sensing, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
[3] Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Inst HHI, Berlin, Germany
关键词
implementation secuirty; free-space optical communication; quantum key distribution; satellite QKD architecture; trusted-node QKD network; TELECOM WAVELENGTHS; SECURITY ANALYSIS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; COMMUNICATION;
D O I
10.1002/sat.1544
中图分类号
V [航空、航天];
学科分类号
08 ; 0825 ;
摘要
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the generation of cryptographic keys beyond the computational hardness paradigm and is befitting for secure data transmission requiring long-term security. The communication distance of fiber-based QKD, however, is limited to a few hundred kilometers due to the exponential scaling of signal attenuation. Satellite QKD (SatQKD) can instead leverage free-space optical links to establish long-range connections and enable global-scale QKD. In this work, we review the manifold of design choices that concur to form the set of possible SatQKD architectures. These include the choice of the QKD protocol and its physical implementation, but also the satellite orbit, the optical link direction, and whether or not to use trusted-node relays. The possible SatQKD architectures are then evaluated in terms of key generation throughput, latency and maximum reachable communication distance, but also system-level security and implementation complexity. Given the technical challenges of realizing SatQKD systems, it is paramount, for near-future satellite missions, to adhere to the simplest possible architecture that still allows to deliver the QKD service. We thus identify as advisable options the use of low-Earth orbit satellites as trusted nodes for prepare-and-measure discrete-variable QKD downlinks with weak laser pulses. The decoy-state version of BB84 is found to be the most promising QKD protocols due to the maturity of the security proofs, the high key generation rate, and low system complexity. These findings are confirmed by the multitude of current and planned SatQKD missions that are adopting these architectural choices.
引用
收藏
页码:164 / 192
页数:29
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