Electoral Benefits of Pork Barrel Politics in the US

被引：0

作者：

Pedron, Stephanie Mae ^{[1
]}

Wessel, Lara ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[2] Georgia Southern Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Int Studies, Armstrong Campus, Statesboro, GA USA

来源：

POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW | 2025年

关键词：

pork barrel politics; distributive politics; electoral incentives; credit claiming; congress; CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS; HOUSE; EARMARKS; PARTIES;

D O I：

10.1177/14789299251323452

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

The conventional wisdom of pork barrel politics is that legislators engage in it to aid their bids for reelection. This review article examines how researchers have tested this conventional wisdom to date, the role of legislator partisanship on the benefits derived, and identifies gaps in the current scholarship.

引用

页数：10

共 39 条

[1] Deficits, democrats, and distributive benefits: Congressional elections and the pork barrel in the 1980s [J].