Unemployment insurance and job polarization

被引:0
作者
Griffy, Benjamin [1 ]
Masters, Adrian [1 ]
You, Kai [1 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Albany, Dept Econ, Albany, NY USA
关键词
Unemployment insurance; Search; Wage dispersion; Re-entitlement effect; Job polarization; EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT; CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR; SEARCH;
D O I
10.1016/j.labeco.2025.102690
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper considers how the structure of the UI system interacts with the observed profile of separations to generate "job-polarization" - wage and separation rate persistence. We extend a standard on-the-job labor search model to include an initial period of high separation rates until the job stochastically becomes more stable. Meanwhile a worker's UI entitlement varies in generosity (based on their former wage) and duration (based on their employment history). The separation structure means that some workers have extended periods of frequent job loss. The UI system amplifies these effects because workers with low benefit eligibility apply for low wage jobs. Their subsequent applications then leave them more highly susceptible to future job loss. Our calibration suggests that this effect accounts for around 1% lower lifetime average wages.
引用
收藏
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
[41]   On the existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses q [J].
Denderski, Piotr ;
Stoltenberg, Christian A. .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2023, 224
[42]   Job-Seeking Behavior in Young Adults: Do Unemployment Insurance Benefits Hurt Job Search Efforts? [J].
Yegidis, Bonnie L. ;
Lee, Beom S. ;
Park, Nan Sook ;
Landers, Monica ;
Kennedy, Margaret M. .
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SERVICE RESEARCH, 2015, 41 (01) :133-140
[43]   Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance policy in general equilibrium [J].
Mukoyama, Toshihiko .
JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 2013, 38 :347-368
[44]   Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare? [J].
Peter Fredriksson ;
Bertil Holmlund .
International Tax and Public Finance, 2006, 13 :565-585
[45]   Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance [J].
Fuller, David L. .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 2014, 62 :108-122
[46]   Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare? [J].
Fredriksson, Peter ;
Holmlund, Bertil .
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, 2006, 13 (05) :565-585
[47]   Optimal unemployment insurance: When search takes effort and money [J].
Schwartz, J. .
LABOUR ECONOMICS, 2015, 36 :1-17
[48]   Public pensions, unemployment insurance, and growth [J].
Corneo, G ;
Marquardt, M .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2000, 75 (02) :293-311
[49]   Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance [J].
Michelacci, Claudio ;
Ruffo, Hernan .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2015, 105 (02) :816-859