Land reform, emerging grassroots democracy and political trust in China

被引:2
作者
Chen, Xing [1 ]
Xu, Jintao [2 ]
Yi, Yuanyuan [2 ,3 ]
Zhuge, Andong
机构
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Int Relat & Publ Affairs, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Peking Univ, China Ctr Econ Res, Natl Sch Dev, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Gothenburg, Environm Dev, Gothenburg, Sweden
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Political trust; Grassroots democracy; Land reform; Collective Forest Tenure Reform; China; PUBLIC-GOODS PROVISION; INVESTMENT INCENTIVES; VILLAGE ELECTIONS; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS; TENURE; GOVERNMENT; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNANCE; SECURITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106792
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This study explores how the application of democratic rule in land reform decision-making determines villagers' political trust towards different levels of the government in China. Analyzing a two-period household survey dataset, we find that in China's recent Collective Forest Tenure Reform, which has devolved the tenure rights of the village collective-owned forestland to households, democratic decision-making increases trust for town and county cadres. The impact on trust towards village cadres is significant only when democracy involves all villagers in a village. We show two mechanisms that improve villagers' trust: the "privatization" effect, where democratic decision-making leads to more land devolved to villagers, and the "conflict-resolving" effect, where improved information and cohesion by mass participation helps resolve inter-village land disputes. Heterogeneity analyses show that democratic decision-making has a more pronounced effect in improving trust for villagers with lower income, and those without affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party or village committees.
引用
收藏
页数:25
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