Correlated equilibrium of games with concave potential functions

被引：0
作者：
Cao, Zhigang [1 ,2 ]
Tan, Zhibin [1 ]
Zhou, Jinchuan [3 ]
机构：
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Beijing Lab Natl Econ Secur Early Warning Engn, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
[3] Shandong Univ Technol, Sch Math & Stat, Dept Stat, Zibo 255049, Shandong, Peoples R China
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2025年 / 60卷
基金：
北京市自然科学基金; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Potential games; Correlated equilibrium; NASH;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2025.107241
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
Neyman (1997) proves in a classical paper that, under certain mild regularity conditions, any strategic game with a smooth strictly concave potential function has a unique correlated equilibrium. We generalize this result by relaxing the smoothness condition, allowing the potential function to include a second part that is not necessarily smoothly concave but separably concave.
引用
收藏
页数：3
相关论文
共 18 条
12