Detection, Identification, and Mitigation of False Data Injection Attacks in Vehicle Platooning

被引:0
|
作者
Ahmed, Najeebuddin [1 ]
Ameli, Amir [1 ]
Naser, Hassan [2 ]
机构
[1] Lakehead Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1, Canada
[2] Lakehead Univ, Dept Software Engn, Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1, Canada
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Observers; Mathematical models; Topology; Vehicle dynamics; Radio frequency; Prevention and mitigation; Wireless communication; Cyber-security; false data injection attack; state-space modeling; unknown input observer; vehicle to vehicle communication; vehicle platooning; MODEL-PREDICTIVE CONTROL;
D O I
10.1109/TVT.2024.3456080
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Vehicle platooning has gained significant attention due to its potential to enhance road safety, fuel efficiency, and traffic flow. However, the reliance on interconnected communication technology in platooning necessitates robust cybersecurity measures. This paper introduces frameworks for detecting and identifying cyber-attacks, specifically False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), aimed at securing vehicle platoons. To achieve this objective, a state-space model is developed, capable of accommodating any information flow topology and any number of vehicles within the platoon. To estimate the internal states of each vehicle, an Unknown Input Observer (UIO) is proposed. The detection of attacks on each vehicle is accomplished by employing a dedicated Detection UIO designed to detect FDIA on the respective vehicle. Furthermore, an Identification UIO is designed to identify compromised parameters of the attacked vehicle and mitigate the attacks by replacing the compromised parameters with their estimated authentic values. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated through MATLAB simulations, encompassing various platooning configurations and attack scenarios. The simulation results highlight the accuracy of attack detection, particularly under stealthy attacks, and the successful identification of compromised vehicles.
引用
收藏
页码:1296 / 1309
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Detection and Prevention of False Data Injection Attacks in the Measurement Infrastructure of Smart Grids
    Shahid, Muhammad Awais
    Ahmad, Fiaz
    Albogamy, Fahad R.
    Hafeez, Ghulam
    Ullah, Zahid
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2022, 14 (11)
  • [22] Achieving Efficient Detection Against False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid
    Xu, Ruzhi
    Wang, Rui
    Guan, Zhitao
    Wu, Longfei
    Wu, Jun
    Du, Xiaojiang
    IEEE ACCESS, 2017, 5 : 13787 - 13798
  • [23] False Data Injection Attacks Detection with Deep Belief Networks in Smart Grid
    Wei, Lei
    Gao, Donghuai
    Luo, Cheng
    2018 CHINESE AUTOMATION CONGRESS (CAC), 2018, : 2621 - 2625
  • [24] Detection and Estimation of False Data Injection Attacks for Load Frequency Control Systems
    Ye, Jun
    Yu, Xiang
    JOURNAL OF MODERN POWER SYSTEMS AND CLEAN ENERGY, 2022, 10 (04) : 861 - 870
  • [25] A novel passive-active detection system for false data injection attacks in industrial control systems
    Ma, Yi-Wei
    Tsou, Chia-Wei
    COMPUTERS & SECURITY, 2024, 145
  • [26] Cyber Cascades Screening Considering the Impacts of False Data Injection Attacks
    Che, Liang
    Liu, Xuan
    Shuai, Zhikang
    Li, Zuyi
    Wen, Yunfeng
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, 2018, 33 (06) : 6545 - 6556
  • [27] Mitigating Concurrent False Data Injection Attacks in Cooperative DC Microgrids
    Zhang, Jingqiu
    Sahoo, Subham
    Peng, Jimmy Chih-Hsien
    Blaabjerg, Frede
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER ELECTRONICS, 2021, 36 (08) : 9637 - 9647
  • [28] DAMGAT-Based Interpretable Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids
    Su, Xiangjing
    Deng, Chao
    Yang, Jiajia
    Li, Fengyong
    Li, Chaojie
    Fu, Yang
    Dong, Zhao Yang
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, 2024, 15 (04) : 4182 - 4195
  • [29] Detection of False Data Injection Attacks Using Cross Wavelet Transform and Machine Learning
    Hakim, Mohammad Sadegh Seyyed
    Karegar, Hossein Kazemi
    2021 11TH SMART GRID CONFERENCE (SGC), 2021, : 106 - 110
  • [30] SRID: State Relation Based Intrusion Detection for False Data Injection Attacks in SCADA
    Wang, Yong
    Xu, Zhaoyan
    Zhang, Jialong
    Xu, Lei
    Wang, Haopei
    Gu, Guofei
    COMPUTER SECURITY - ESORICS 2014, PT II, 2014, 8713 : 401 - 418