Governments worldwide use executive compensation to bond CEOs of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to political agendas at the expense of private owners. We extend principal-principal (PP) agency theory to delve into the CEO cooption behavior of governments. First, building on the institution-based view, we theorize that political institutions shape the ability of governments to trigger PP conflicts by bonding SOE CEOs through executive compensation. Second, leveraging the comparative state capitalism literature, we conjecture that SOE CEOs who are bonded through executive compensation support strategies that are aligned with state goals. Evidence from matched samples of publicly listed firms across 20 countries supports our predictions. The effect of state ownership on CEO compensation varies substantially across countries and this variance is partly explained by the heterogeneity in political institutions. More specifically, we find that SOE CEOs enjoy higher compensation in contexts characterized by high political power and political factionalization, and low political polarization and political constraint. We also find that better-paid SOE CEOs support excessive levels of employment and corporate social performance, strategies aligned with state goals. Overall, we show that CEO compensation is a salient and effective tool used by governments to turn SOE CEOs into agents of the state. Les gouvernements du monde entier utilisent la r & eacute;mun & eacute;ration des dirigeants pour lier les PDG (CEOs) des entreprises publiques (State-Owned Enterprises - SOEs) aux programmes politiques au d & eacute;triment des propri & eacute;taires priv & eacute;s. Nous & eacute;tendons la th & eacute;orie de l'agence li & eacute;e & agrave; la relation principal-principal (PP) pour & eacute;tudier le comportement de cooptation des CEOs des gouvernements. Tout d'abord, nous appuyant sur la th & eacute;orie institutionnelle, nous th & eacute;orisons que les institutions politiques d & eacute;terminent la capacit & eacute; des gouvernements & agrave; d & eacute;clencher des conflits PP en liant les CEOs des SOEs par le biais de la r & eacute;mun & eacute;ration des dirigeants. Ensuite, nous basant sur la litt & eacute;rature comparative sur le capitalisme d'& Eacute;tat, nous supposons que les CEOs des SOEs li & eacute;s par la r & eacute;mun & eacute;ration soutiennent des strat & eacute;gies qui sont align & eacute;es sur les objectifs de l'& Eacute;tat. Nos pr & eacute;dictions sont corrobor & eacute;es par les r & eacute;sultats des analyses sur des & eacute;chantillons appari & eacute;s couvrant des entreprises cot & eacute;es en bourse dans 20 pays. L'impact de la propri & eacute;t & eacute; de l'& Eacute;tat sur la r & eacute;mun & eacute;ration des CEOs varie consid & eacute;rablement d'un pays & agrave; l'autre, et cette variance s'explique en partie par l'h & eacute;t & eacute;rog & eacute;n & eacute;it & eacute; des institutions politiques. Plus pr & eacute;cis & eacute;ment, nous constatons que les CEOs des SOEs b & eacute;n & eacute;ficient d'une r & eacute;mun & eacute;ration plus & eacute;lev & eacute;e dans les contextes caract & eacute;ris & eacute;s par une factionnalisation et un pouvoir politiques & eacute;lev & eacute;s, et par une polarisation et une contrainte politiques faibles. Nous constatons & eacute;galement que les CEOs des SOEs mieux r & eacute;mun & eacute;r & eacute;s soutiennent des niveaux excessifs d'emploi et de performance sociale des entreprises, des strat & eacute;gies align & eacute;es sur les objectifs de l'& Eacute;tat. Dans l'ensemble, nous d & eacute;montrons que la r & eacute;mun & eacute;ration des CEOs est un outil important et efficace utilis & eacute; par les gouvernements pour transformer les CEOs des SOEs en agents de l'& Eacute;tat. Los gobiernos de todo el mundo utilizan la compensaci & oacute;n ejecutiva para vincular a los CEO de empresas estatales con agendas pol & iacute;ticas a expensas de los propietarios privados. Extendemos la teor & iacute;a de agencia principal-principal (PP) para profundizar en el comportamiento de cooptaci & oacute;n de CEO por parte de los gobiernos. Primero, bas & aacute;ndonos en la perspectiva institucional, teorizamos que las instituciones pol & iacute;ticas moldean la capacidad de los gobiernos para desencadenar conflictos PP mediante la vinculaci & oacute;n de los CEO de empresas estatales a trav & eacute;s de la compensaci & oacute;n ejecutiva. Segundo, aprovechando la literatura sobre capitalismo estatal comparado, conjeturamos que los CEO de empresas estatales vinculados mediante compensaci & oacute;n apoyan estrategias alineadas con los objetivos estatales. La evidencia de muestras pareadas que abarca empresas que cotizan en bolsa de 20 pa & iacute;ses corrobora nuestras predicciones. El efecto de la propiedad estatal sobre la compensaci & oacute;n de los CEO var & iacute;a sustancialmente entre pa & iacute;ses, y esta variaci & oacute;n se explica en parte por la heterogeneidad en las instituciones pol & iacute;ticas. M & aacute;s espec & iacute;ficamente, encontramos que los CEO de empresas estatales gozan de mayor compensaci & oacute;n en contextos caracterizados por alto poder pol & iacute;tico y faccionalizaci & oacute;n pol & iacute;tica, y baja polarizaci & oacute;n pol & iacute;tica y restricci & oacute;n pol & iacute;tica. Tambi & eacute;n encontramos que los CEO de empresas estatales mejor remunerados apoyan niveles excesivos de empleo y desempe & ntilde;o social corporativo, estrategias alineadas con los objetivos estatales. En general, demostramos que la compensaci & oacute;n de los CEO es una herramienta destacada y efectiva utilizada por los gobiernos para convertir a los CEO de empresas estatales en agentes del Estado. Governos em todo o mundo usam a remunera & ccedil;& atilde;o de executivos para alinhar CEOs de empresas estatais com agendas pol & iacute;ticas & agrave;s custas dos propriet & aacute;rios privados. Estendemos a teoria da ag & ecirc;ncia principal-principal (PP) para aprofundar o comportamento de coopta & ccedil;& atilde;o de CEO por governos. Primeiramente, a partir da vis & atilde;o baseada em institui & ccedil;& otilde;es, teorizamos que institui & ccedil;& otilde;es pol & iacute;ticas moldam a capacidade dos governos de desencadear conflitos PP vinculando CEOs de empresas estatais por meio da remunera & ccedil;& atilde;o dos executivos. Em segundo lugar, alavancando a literatura comparada do capitalismo de estado, conjecturamos que CEOs de empresas estatais se associam por meio de estrat & eacute;gias de apoio & agrave; remunera & ccedil;& atilde;o alinhadas com objetivos do estado. Evid & ecirc;ncias de amostras pareadas cobrindo empresas de capital aberto de 20 pa & iacute;ses corroboram nossas previs & otilde;es. O efeito da propriedade estatal na remunera & ccedil;& atilde;o de CEOs varia substancialmente entre pa & iacute;ses e essa varia & ccedil;& atilde;o & eacute; parcialmente explicada pela heterogeneidade nas institui & ccedil;& otilde;es pol & iacute;ticas. Mais especificamente, descobrimos que CEOs de empresas estatais desfrutam de maior remunera & ccedil;& atilde;o em contextos caracterizados por alto poder pol & iacute;tico e fac & ccedil;& otilde;es pol & iacute;ticas, e baixa polariza & ccedil;& atilde;o e restri & ccedil;& atilde;o pol & iacute;tica. Tamb & eacute;m descobrimos que CEOs de empresas estatais mais bem pagos apoiam n & iacute;veis excessivos de emprego e desempenho social corporativo, estrat & eacute;gias alinhadas com metas do estado. No geral, mostramos que a remunera & ccedil;& atilde;o de CEOs & eacute; uma ferramenta saliente e eficaz usada por governos para transformar CEOs de empresas estatais em agentes do estado. (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic) (SOE) (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(CEO)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)-(sic)(sic)(sic)(PP)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic) PP (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic) 20 (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic). 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