Political control, corporate governance and stock-price crash risk: Evidence from China

被引:1
作者
San, Ziyao [1 ]
Wang, Shuai [2 ]
Xiu, Zongfeng [3 ]
Zhou, Ling [4 ]
Zhou, Zejiang [5 ]
机构
[1] Capital Univ Econ & Business, Coll Business Adm, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Accounting, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] Cent South Univ, Business Sch, Changsha, Peoples R China
[4] Univ New Mexico, Anderson Sch Management, Albuquerque, NM USA
[5] Anhui Univ, Sch Business, Hefei, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Corporate governance; Stock price crash risk; Board director; State-owned enterprises (SOE); The impact of politics; Communist Party of China; Disciplinary commission; INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY; MANAGERIAL ABILITY; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ememar.2025.101260
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOEs) with Disciplinary Commission members on the board experience lower stock price crash risk than their counterparts. This effect is less pronounced for SOEs with more shares held by non-state large shareholders. The results are robust after addressing potential endogeneity issues related to the appointment of the board of directors. Additional analysis suggests that the inclusion of Disciplinary Commission members on the board of directors reduces crash risk by mitigating agency costs, curtailing overinvestment, and improving financial reporting transparency. Collectively, our findings support the notion that the presence of Disciplinary Commission members on the board of directors strengthens the governance of SOEs.
引用
收藏
页数:20
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