Idealization in Moral Understanding: Grasping Less but Acting Better

Moral understanding has typically been defined as grasping the explanation, q, for some proposition, p, where p states that some action is morally right (or wrong). This article deals with an underdiscussed point within the literature on moral understanding: the degree of moral understanding one has deepens with the more moral reasons that one grasps, whereby these reasons not only consist of those that speak in favor of an action's moral permissibility but also those speaking against. I argue for a surprising and important implication of this: having a deep degree of moral understanding can make it harder to carry out the right action. Furthermore, I propose that we should think of our pursuit of moral understanding in an analogous way as to how some have thought of scientific understanding: There may be good reasons to fail to appreciate all of the actual moral reasons that in fact exist; sometimes we should seek a surfaced-level moral understanding instead of something deeper. Just as idealizations used within science - which can involve deviations from the truth - can help us achieve scientific understanding, so too we might restrict the moral reasons that we seek to grasp in pursuit of moral understanding.