Institutional dual ownership and voluntary greenhouse gas emission disclosure

被引:6
作者
Barg, Johannes A. [1 ]
Drobetz, Wolfgang [1 ]
El Ghoul, Sadok [2 ]
Guedhami, Omrane [3 ,5 ]
Schroeder, Henning [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hamburg, Fac Business Adm, Moorweidenstr 18, D-20148 Hamburg, Germany
[2] Univ Alberta, Campus St Jean,8406 Rue Marie Anne Gaboury 91 St, Edmonton, AB T6C 4G9, Canada
[3] Univ South Carolina, Darla Moore Sch Business, 1014 Greene St, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
[4] Leuphana Univ Luneburg, Sch Management & Technol, Univ Allee 1, D-21335 Luneburg, Germany
[5] Sungkyunkwan Univ SKKU, SKK Business Sch, Seoul, South Korea
关键词
Climate change; Greenhouse gas emission disclosure; Institutional investors; Dual holders; Climate finance; VALUE RELEVANCE; FIRM-VALUE; CORPORATE; EQUITY; COST; RISK; DEBT; SHAREHOLDERS; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102671
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper shows evidence of a positive relationship between institutional dual holders, who hold both equity and debt in a firm, and voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emission disclosure. Considering dual holders as particularly risk-sensitive institutional investors, we document that improvements in voluntary GHG emission disclosure are motivated by climate-conscious and riskrelated considerations. The positive effect of institutional dual ownership is more pronounced in firms facing significant environmental risks, where disclosure enables clearer explanations and prevents exaggerated stakeholder reactions. The impact of dual ownership is also stronger in firms with poor information environments, where dual holders exploit their enhanced monitoring capacity through gathering information from both their public equity and private debt holdings. Consistent with our risk-based explanation, voluntary GHG emission disclosure reduces the cost of equity and increases firm valuation in firms with higher dual ownership.
引用
收藏
页数:22
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