Fiscal Federalism in the Twenty-First Century

被引:7
作者
Agrawal, David R. [1 ,2 ,5 ]
Brueckner, Jan K. [3 ,5 ]
Brulhart, Marius [4 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kentucky, Martin Sch Publ Policy, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
[2] Univ Kentucky, Dept Econ, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
[3] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA USA
[4] Univ Lausanne, Dept Econ, Fac Business & Econ, Lausanne, Switzerland
[5] CESifo, Munich, Germany
[6] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London, England
关键词
fiscal federalism; intergovernmental relations; grants; fiscal competition; fiscal externalities; decentralization; LOCAL PUBLIC-GOODS; SHARED TAX SOURCES; COMPETITIVE-EQUILIBRIUM; DECENTRALIZED PROVISION; VERTICAL EXTERNALITIES; MATCHING GRANTS; SPILLOVERS; TAXATION; POLICY; ECONOMIES;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-economics-081623-020713
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Fiscal federalism concerns the division of policy responsibilities amongdifferent levels of government. Many current economic and policy developments, such as globalization, environmental crises, and rising inequality,may not appear to be favorable to fiscal federalism, yet countries are furtherdecentralizing their fiscal systems. We summarize the efficiency and equityaspects of fiscal decentralization, fiscal competition, fiscal externalities, andintergovernmental grants. The review introduces readers to theoretical rea-sons for/against a federalist structure. We discuss how federalism relates toclassic problems in economics: externalities, inequality, spillovers, informa-tion, and aspects of political economy. Our review integrates both theory andempirics, while also focusing on the variety of federal systems in differentcountries, both developing and developed. We conclude by discussing howfiscal federalism is being shaped by economic, technological, and environ-mental changes, while discussing the effects of globalization, polarization,and global crises on the future of federal systems.
引用
收藏
页码:429 / 454
页数:26
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