Organizational form and liquidity management: Evidence from open- vs. closed-end municipal bond funds

被引:0
|
作者
Chalmers, John [1 ]
Wang, Z. Jay [1 ]
Yang, Jingyun [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oregon, Lundquist Coll Business, 1208 Univ Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
[2] Shanghai Lixin Univ Accounting & Finance, Sch Accounting, 2800 Wenxiang Rd, Shanghai 201620, Peoples R China
关键词
Closed-end fund; Open-end fund; Organizational form; Liquidity management; ABILITY; COSTS; FLOWS; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.frl.2024.106499
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper studies how the organizational forms of open- and closed-end funds affect their ability to manage illiquid assets. We use a sample of municipal bond funds from 2002 to 2015 to compare the portfolio liquidity and performance of open- and closed-end funds. We find that immunity to redemption risk allows closed-end funds to hold more illiquid municipal bonds than open-end funds, and they charge higher management fees for such liquidity provision. Closed- end funds earn liquidity premiums from their illiquid holdings. They significantly underperform peer open-end funds after controlling for their exposure to liquidity risk. Highly leveraged closed-end funds are subject to systematic liquidity risk. We find that closed-end funds with higher leverage hold more liquid municipal bonds. They trade more liquid municipal bonds to reduce the potential costs at forced deleverage.
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页数:15
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