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Organizational form and liquidity management: Evidence from open- vs. closed-end municipal bond funds
被引:0
|作者:
Chalmers, John
[1
]
Wang, Z. Jay
[1
]
Yang, Jingyun
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Oregon, Lundquist Coll Business, 1208 Univ Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
[2] Shanghai Lixin Univ Accounting & Finance, Sch Accounting, 2800 Wenxiang Rd, Shanghai 201620, Peoples R China
关键词:
Closed-end fund;
Open-end fund;
Organizational form;
Liquidity management;
ABILITY;
COSTS;
FLOWS;
RISK;
D O I:
10.1016/j.frl.2024.106499
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper studies how the organizational forms of open- and closed-end funds affect their ability to manage illiquid assets. We use a sample of municipal bond funds from 2002 to 2015 to compare the portfolio liquidity and performance of open- and closed-end funds. We find that immunity to redemption risk allows closed-end funds to hold more illiquid municipal bonds than open-end funds, and they charge higher management fees for such liquidity provision. Closed- end funds earn liquidity premiums from their illiquid holdings. They significantly underperform peer open-end funds after controlling for their exposure to liquidity risk. Highly leveraged closed-end funds are subject to systematic liquidity risk. We find that closed-end funds with higher leverage hold more liquid municipal bonds. They trade more liquid municipal bonds to reduce the potential costs at forced deleverage.
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页数:15
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