Institutional investor networks and earnings management: The role of the exit threat

被引:1
作者
Li, Jie [1 ]
Zhang, Yuzhao [2 ]
Zhang, Yongjie [3 ,4 ]
Xiong, Xiong [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Audit Univ, Sch Finance, Nanjing 211815, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Nanjing 210023, Peoples R China
[3] Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China
[4] Tianjin Univ, Lab Computat & Analyt Complex Management Syst CACM, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Institutional investor networks; Earnings management; Exit threat; Multiplex network; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FAMILY FIRMS; REAL; POLICIES;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106903
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the potential of institutional investor networks in mitigating horizontal agency conflicts, addressing the gap in the regulatory role of institutional investors in concentrated equity markets. Using data on Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2020, we employ the multiplex network method to investigate the impact of institutional investor networks on earnings management. Our findings reveal a significant negative correlation between institutional investor networks and earnings management. The mechanism analysis indicates that institutional investor networks primarily exert governance through the exit threat rather than through direct intervention and information dissemination. Collectively, our findings elucidate the important role of institutional investors in corporate governance and promote the application of multiplex network theory to the financial field.
引用
收藏
页数:18
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