Distributed Resilient Energy Management for Seaport Microgrid Against Stealthy Attacks With Limited Security Defense Resource

This article investigates the distributed resilient energy management (EM) strategy for the seaport microgrid under stealthy attacks. First, based on an analysis of seaport microgrid characteristics, we construct an EM model that aims at minimizing both operating cost and security defense resource (SDR) cost. Second, we present a distributed, resilient strategy by defining node security levels and establishing dynamic security intervals. We prove that the gap between the obtained feasible solution and the optimal one is bounded. The designed strategy is capable of tolerating the effect of the unlimited number of stealthy attacked nodes on the seaport microgrid. In addition, given the limited SDRs for the resilient EM of the island seaport microgrid, a distributed mechanism for searching the minimum security connected dominating set (MSCDS) is proposed to minimize the size of trusted nodes. Finally, simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy. Note to Practitioners: This article addresses the vulnerability of the seaport microgrid, a critical issue that impacts EM and disrupts seaport operations. Current approaches to seaport EM do not account for potential attacks. Meanwhile, existing methods for attack resilience often overlook the costs of security resources. We propose a new approach for the distributed and resilient EM of the island seaport microgrid. Secure operation is achieved by protecting the fewest trusted nodes, thereby conserving SDRs. We then show how this algorithm (searching the MSCDS) can be efficiently designed. Preliminary simulations indicate its feasibility, though it has yet to be tested in a production environment. Future research will focus on designing trusted nodes within dynamic topologies.