Implicit Bias about Implicit Bias: A Gadamerian Perspective

The concept of implicit bias has become a staple in social psychology as well as epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy; so much so that so-called implicit association tests (IAT) and policies against the effects of implicit bias have been implemented as political tools (particularly in Anglophone countries). This article argues that parts of implicit bias research rest on two assumptions which have not yet received sufficient critical attention. The eradication assumption holds that implicit biases can and ought to be done away with. The pejorative assumption holds that biases are necessarily morally (and/or epistemically) pernicious. Drawing on Gadamer's hermeneutic theory of Vorurteil (prejudice), this article argues that implicit bias is a smaller species of the wider genus of (Gadamerian) prejudices such that both the eradication assumption and pejorative assumption turn out to be flawed. This is to the effect that implicit biases are neither necessarily morally pernicious, nor can they be fully eradicated. Instead, they present an essential part of human cognition as such.