The primacy of practical life: Heidegger's concealment of Scheler's phenomenological breakthrough

In this paper I will reply to Heidegger's critique in Sein und Zeit against Scheler's phenomenology of value, which is based on the omission of the corresponding phenomenological theory of thingness. I will show that Heidegger's reproach does not reach Scheler's point of view, which anticipates for more than a decade Sein und Zeit's phenomenological defense of the primacy of practical life; in fact, only Scheler's conception of value makes it viable. Finally, I will argue that Heidegger's understanding of << worldhood >> (Weltlichkeit), also independent from the category of << thing >>, comes very close to Scheler's notion of << environment >> (Umwelt) -instead of << world >> (Welt)-, which reinforces the accusation of vitalism directed by Scheler against Heidegger in Das emotionale Realit & auml;tsproblem