Social Movements, Public Policy, and Informal Institutions: The Role of Patronage in Chile (2006-2022)

被引:0
作者
Barozet, Emmanuelle [1 ]
Espinoza, Vicente [2 ]
Moya, Emilio [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chile, Dept Sociol, Ctr Estudios Cohes & Conflicto Social CDES, Santiago, Chile
[2] Ctr Estudios Cohes & Conflicto Social COES, Santiago, Chile
[3] Univ Catol Temuco, Dept Sociol & Polit Sci, Temuco, Chile
关键词
Chile; clientelism; informal institutions; Latin America; patronage; public policies; social conflict; social movements; (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic); (sic)(sic); (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic); Am & eacute; rica Latina; clientelismo; conflicto social; instituciones informales; movimientos sociales; pol & iacute; ticas p & uacute; blicas;
D O I
10.1111/polp.70007
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The article analyzes how mobilization and public policy meet and shape one another in Chile over almost two decades, characterized by an intensive cycle of collective action (2006-2022). By examining the interrelationship between mobilization and public policy, we argue that patronage is the glue that binds the two issues. Using descriptive data from the Conflict Observatory of the Center for Social Cohesion and Conflict Studies, as well as secondary information produced by state agencies in Chile and primary information comprising fieldwork conducted in six regions between 2003 and 2021, we show that until 2019, patronage channeled and attenuated social conflict in specific areas, enabling the rapid delivery of social benefits and jobs that public policies should transparently manage but do not. (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(2006(sic)(sic)2022(sic)).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic).(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)"(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic),(sic)(sic)2003(sic)(sic)2021(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)2019(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic), (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)((sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic))(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic). El art & iacute;culo analiza c & oacute;mo la movilizaci & oacute;n y las pol & iacute;ticas p & uacute;blicas se encuentran y se moldean mutuamente en Chile a lo largo de casi dos d & eacute;cadas, caracterizadas por un ciclo intensivo de acci & oacute;n colectiva (2006-2022). Al examinar la interrelaci & oacute;n entre movilizaci & oacute;n y pol & iacute;tica p & uacute;blica, sostenemos que el clientelismo es el pegamento que une ambas cuestiones. Utilizando datos descriptivos del Observatorio de Conflictos del Centro de Cohesi & oacute;n Social y Estudios de Conflictos, as & iacute; como informaci & oacute;n secundaria producida por agencias estatales en Chile e informaci & oacute;n primaria compuesta por trabajos de campo realizados en seis regiones entre 2003 y 2021, mostramos que hasta 2019 el clientelismo canaliz & oacute; y atenuaci & oacute;n del conflicto social en & aacute;reas espec & iacute;ficas, permitiendo la r & aacute;pida entrega de beneficios sociales y empleos que las pol & iacute;ticas p & uacute;blicas deber & iacute;an gestionar de manera transparente pero no lo hacen.
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