Insider Stock Ownership and Earnings Persistence: Evidence from China

被引：0

作者：

Minsi, Lin ^{[1
]}

Razali, Fazlida Mohd ^{[2
]}

Johari, Razana Juhaida ^{[3
]}

Jasni, Nur Syuhada ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Minjiang Univ, Univ Teknol MARA, Accounting Res Inst HICoE, Malaysia & Sch Econ & Management, Fuzhou, Peoples R China

[2] Univ Teknol MARA, Malaysia & Fac Accountancy, Accounting Res Inst HICoE, Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia

[3] Univ Teknol MARA, Fac Accountancy, Kampus Puncak Alam, Cawangan Selangor, Selangor, Malaysia

来源：

PUBLIC ORGANIZATION REVIEW | 2025年 / 25卷 / 02期

关键词：

Insider Stock Ownership; Supervisory Board; Agency Theory; Earnings Persistence; FIRM PERFORMANCE EVIDENCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MARKET VALUATION; AGENCY; BOARD; SHAREHOLDERS; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1007/s11115-025-00830-3

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;

摘要：

This study examines the impact of insider stock ownership on earnings persistence within the framework of agency theory following the 2018 implementation of a revised Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China. Analyzing data from A-share firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2018 to 2021, the results show a significant positive impact of ownership by boards of directors, executives, and actual controllers on earnings persistence. Supervisory board ownership did not have a significant impact on earnings persistence. These findings bring attention to issues concerning the efficacy of internal governance in Chinese listed firms.

引用

页码：613 / 632

页数：20

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