Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy

被引:0
作者
Ferre, Montserrat [1 ,2 ]
Macaya, Oscar [3 ]
Manzano, Carolina [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rovira i Virgili, Av Univ 1, Reus 43204, Spain
[2] ECO SOS, Av Univ 1, Reus 43204, Spain
[3] Ctr Estudis Super Aviacio CESDA, Reus, Spain
关键词
central bank transparency; inflation target; macroeconomic volatility; welfare; MONETARY-POLICY; UNCERTAINTY; CREDIBILITY; DISCRETION; TALK;
D O I
10.1111/coep.12667
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.
引用
收藏
页码:642 / 659
页数:18
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