Let the Users Choose: Low Latency or Strong Anonymity? Investigating Mix Nodes with Paired Mixing Techniques

被引:1
作者
Gaballah, Sarah Abdelwahab [1 ]
Abdullah, Lamya [2 ]
Muehlhaeuser, Max [2 ]
Marky, Karola [1 ]
机构
[1] Ruhr Univ Bochum, Bochum, Germany
[2] Tech Univ Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
来源
19TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AVAILABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND SECURITY, ARES 2024 | 2024年
关键词
Mix networks; mixing techniques; anonymity; latency; ATTACKS;
D O I
10.1145/3664476.3664516
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Current anonymous communication systems either provide strong anonymity with significant delay or low latency with unreliable anonymity. This division leads to smaller user bases and reduced anonymity as users choose systems based on their specific requirements. To address this issue, we propose an approach based on mix networks that employs two mixing techniques on mix nodes. Each technique offers distinct anonymity and latency guarantees-one for users valuing strong anonymity and another for those with specific latency constraints. We conducted an in-depth empirical study to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposal. The evaluation results demonstrate that our approach provides much more protection than the traditional method of using just one mixing technique on mix nodes. It offers enhanced anonymity for all users without impacting any user's latency requirements. Furthermore, our findings indicate that our proposal eliminates the need for generating cover traffic to improve anonymity, achieving this improvement without introducing the bandwidth overhead associated with cover traffic.
引用
收藏
页数:11
相关论文
共 34 条
[1]  
Berthold O., 2001, Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol.2009), P30
[2]  
Chaum David, 2017, Applied Cryptography and Network Security. 15th International Conference, ACNS 2017. Proceedings: LNCS 10355, P557, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1_28
[3]   UNTRACEABLE ELECTRONIC MAIL, RETURN ADDRESSES, AND DIGITAL PSEUDONYMS [J].
CHAUM, DL .
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 1981, 24 (02) :84-88
[4]   Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: a Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow [J].
Chen, Shuo ;
Wang, Rui ;
Wang, XiaoFeng ;
Zhang, Kehuan .
2010 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 2010, :191-206
[5]  
Danezis G, 2005, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V3424, P35
[6]  
Danezis G, 2003, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V2760, P1
[7]   Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format [J].
Danezis, George ;
Goldberg, Ian .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 30TH IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 2009, :269-+
[8]   AnonPubSub: Anonymous publish-subscribe overlays [J].
Daubert, Joerg ;
Fischer, Mathias ;
Grube, Tim ;
Schiffner, Stefan ;
Kikiras, Panayotis ;
Muehlhaeuser, Max .
COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, 2016, 76 :42-53
[9]  
Díaz C, 2004, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V3193, P141
[10]  
Díaz C, 2003, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V2482, P54