Tax control and corporate VAT compliance: An empirical assessment of the moderating role of tax strategy

被引:0
作者
Sigle, Maarten A. [1 ,2 ]
Goslinga, Sjoerd [2 ,3 ]
van der Hel, Lisette E. C. J. M. [1 ]
Wilson, Ryan J. [4 ]
机构
[1] Nyenrode Business Univ, Straatweg 25, NL-3621 BG Breukelen, Netherlands
[2] Netherlands Tax Adm, Nijmegen, Netherlands
[3] Leiden Univ, Wassenaarseweg 52, NL-2333 AK Leiden, Netherlands
[4] Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
关键词
VAT compliance; Tax strategy; Internal control; Tax control framework; COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE; AGGRESSIVENESS; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2024.100655
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Tax control frameworks (TCF) of higher quality are seen by tax authorities and the OECD as a prerequisite for corporate tax compliance. However, a higher quality TCF can also enable organizations to reduce their tax burden by providing information that allows them to make the best use of opportunities within the boundaries of the tax law. We investigate the effect of TCF quality on tax compliance by looking at the tax strategy of the organization and whether the organization unintentionally or intentionally fails to comply. We focus on Value Added Tax (VAT) and test our hypotheses using a sample of large organizations, using a combination of survey data and tax audit results from the Netherlands. Our results show that a TCF of higher quality is positively associated with VAT compliance, resulting in both less unintentional and less intentional errors requiring tax adjustment. For organizations with a more conservative tax strategy, we find that the quality of the TCF does not affect the level of intentional non-compliance. For organizations with a more aggressive tax strategy, however, the level of intentional non-compliance is conditional upon the quality of the TCF, with a lower (higher) quality TCF leading to more (less) intentional non-compliance.
引用
收藏
页数:13
相关论文
共 41 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 2004, ENTERPRISE RISK MANA
  • [2] [Anonymous], 1992, INTERNAL CONTROL INT
  • [3] Tax Avoidance and the Implications of Weak Internal Controls
    Bauer, Andrew M.
    [J]. CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2016, 33 (02) : 449 - 486
  • [4] Do audits enhance compliance? An empirical assessment of VAT enforcement
    Bergman, Marcelo
    Nevarez, Armando
    [J]. NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, 2006, 59 (04) : 817 - 832
  • [5] Bimo I. D., 2019, Journal of Economics and Development, V21, P131, DOI [10.1108/JED-10-2019-0042, DOI 10.1108/JED-10-2019-0042]
  • [6] Blaufus K., 2023, Journal of Business Economics, V93, P509, DOI [10.1007/s11573-022-01116-6, DOI 10.1007/S11573-022-01116-6]
  • [7] DEFINING AND MEASURING TAX PLANNING AGGRESSIVENESS
    Blouin, Jennifer
    [J]. NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, 2014, 67 (04) : 875 - 899
  • [8] How Internal Control Protects Shareholders' Welfare: Evidence from Tax Avoidance in China
    Chang, Hsihui
    Dai, Xin
    He, Yurun
    Wang, Maolin
    [J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2020, 19 (02) : 19 - 39
  • [9] The Moderating Role of Internal Control in Tax Avoidance: Evidence from a COSO-Based Internal Control Index in China
    Chen, Hanwen
    Yang, Daoguang
    Zhang, Xinmin
    Zhou, Nan
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN TAXATION ASSOCIATION, 2020, 42 (01): : 23 - 55
  • [10] D'Ascenzo AOM, 2015, J TAX ADM, V1, P81