Dual-use research in philosophy: can there be such a thing?

The aim of this article is to explore whether and how the concept of dual-use can be applied to philosophical research, as well as its potential for explaining cases of misuse of philosophical theory and for justifying any restrictions on academic freedom. I argue that there are two ways in which philosophical research can be misused: by using its methods for purposes that contradict the general purposes of philosophy, and by using (parts of) a theory against the purposes intended by its author. Philosophical research is dual-use research of concern (DURC) if the theory can be misused without modification, which is the case when a theory is not entirely conclusive. The misuse of philosophical research differs from the misuse in paradigmatic cases of DURC in that its potential to cause harm depends on social conditions. Given these conditions and the lack of relevant research, the risk of harmful misuse of philosophy as of yet does not constitute a sufficient reason to restrict academic freedom in a meaningful way. Instead, researchers should be aware of any potential for misuse, make their arguments as conclusive as possible, and emphasise the aim of their theory. To prevent harmful misuse in the public sphere, scholars should engage in public philosophy and provide an accurate and conclusive account of their research. Institutions should support this.