共 24 条
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL INVESTMENT AND REINSURANCE GAME BETWEEN AN INSURER AND A REINSURER WITH DELAY AND DEFAULT RISK UNDER THINNING DEPENDENCE STRUCTURE
被引:0
|作者:
Wang, Ge
[1
,2
]
Lu, Yuxuan
[3
]
Zhou, Qing
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, Sch Sci, Beijing 100876, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, Key Lab Math & Informat Networks, Minist Educ, Beijing 100876, Peoples R China
[3] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Math, Singapore 119076, Singapore
基金:
国家重点研发计划;
关键词:
Stochastic differential game;
thinning dependence;
square-root factor model;
investment and reinsurance;
delay;
OF-LOSS REINSURANCE;
TIME-CONSISTENT INVESTMENT;
ROBUST OPTIMAL INVESTMENT;
MEAN-VARIANCE INSURERS;
PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION;
CONSTANT ELASTICITY;
STRATEGY;
MODEL;
PROBABILITY;
D O I:
10.3934/jimo.2025032
中图分类号:
T [工业技术];
学科分类号:
08 ;
摘要:
. This paper investigates a stochastic differential investment and reinsurance game between an insurer and a reinsurer with delay and default risk. The insurer has the option to purchase a proportional reinsurance contract to mitigate claim risk while investing in three assets: a risk-free asset, a risky asset whose price process is described by the square-root factor model, and a defaultable bond. The reinsurer can sell reinsurance contracts and invest in the financial market. Furthermore, the claim business between the insurer and the reinsurer is correlated through the thinning dependence structure. In consideration of the performance-related capital inflow/outflow, the wealth process of the insurer or reinsurer is modeled by a stochastic differential delay equation. The competitive relationship between them is characterized by the non-zero-sum stochastic differential game in which they consider the relative performance measured by the difference in their terminal wealth. The objective of each competitor is to maximize the mean-variance utility of the combination of his terminal wealth and the relative performance. Subsequently, we solve the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and then the Nash equilibrium strategies as well as the value functions are derived. Finally, sensitivity analysis is conducted to explain the effects of model parameters on the equilibrium strategy.
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页码:3790 / 3836
页数:47
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