Loan loss provisions;
Common ownership;
Managerial incentives;
Readability;
Comparability of financial statements;
Private information gathering;
Stock liquidity;
DISCLOSURE REGULATION;
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT;
MARKET COMPETITION;
INFORMATION;
RISK;
FIRMS;
LIQUIDITY;
INVESTORS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.bar.2024.101445
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Over 74% of US banks share common ownership with other banks. Our analysis of a large sample of US banks reveals that those with greater common ownership demonstrate heightened transparency. This manifests as reduced discretion in loan loss provisions, improved financial statement readability, and enhanced comparability. We pinpoint three underlying mechanisms: decreased private information gathering, increased stock liquidity, and diminished managerial incentives for opacity. Furthermore, these commonly owned banks exhibit lower crash risk due to their improved transparency. Our findings hold after using various proxies and two endogeneity-reduction methods: a difference-in-differences analysis based on the 2009 Blackrock-Barclays Global Investors merger and an instrumental variable approach using Russell 2000 index inclusions. Overall, our study underscores the positive impact of common ownership in the banking sector.
机构:
IESE Business Sch, Barcelona, SpainIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Anton, Miguel
Ederer, Florian
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Yale Sch Management, New Haven, CT USA
Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA USAIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Ederer, Florian
Gine, Mireia
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
IESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
European Corp Governance Inst ECGI, Brussels, Belgium
Wharton Res Data Serv, Philadelphia, PA USAIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Gine, Mireia
Schmalz, Martin
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
European Corp Governance Inst ECGI, Brussels, Belgium
Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Oxford, England
Ctr Econ Policy Res, London, England
CESifo, Munich, Germany
Ctr Social & Econ Behav, Cologne, GermanyIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
机构:
IESE Business Sch, Barcelona, SpainIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Azar, Jose
Schmalz, Martin C.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Michigan, Ctr Econ Policy Res, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
European Corp Governance Inst, Brussels, BelgiumIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Schmalz, Martin C.
Tecu, Isabel
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Charles River Associates Inc, Boston, MA USAIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
机构:
IESE Business Sch, Barcelona, SpainIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Anton, Miguel
Ederer, Florian
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Yale Sch Management, New Haven, CT USA
Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA USAIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Ederer, Florian
Gine, Mireia
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
IESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
European Corp Governance Inst ECGI, Brussels, Belgium
Wharton Res Data Serv, Philadelphia, PA USAIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Gine, Mireia
Schmalz, Martin
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
European Corp Governance Inst ECGI, Brussels, Belgium
Univ Oxford, Said Business Sch, Oxford, England
Ctr Econ Policy Res, London, England
CESifo, Munich, Germany
Ctr Social & Econ Behav, Cologne, GermanyIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
机构:
IESE Business Sch, Barcelona, SpainIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Azar, Jose
Schmalz, Martin C.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Michigan, Ctr Econ Policy Res, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
European Corp Governance Inst, Brussels, BelgiumIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain
Schmalz, Martin C.
Tecu, Isabel
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Charles River Associates Inc, Boston, MA USAIESE Business Sch, Barcelona, Spain