The bright side of common ownership: Evidence from bank transparency

被引:1
作者
Park, Haerang [1 ]
Pathan, Shams [2 ]
Stathopoulos, Konstantinos [3 ]
Marwick, Alex [4 ]
机构
[1] Korea Univ, Coll Global Business, Sejong, South Korea
[2] Newcastle Univ, Business Sch, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 4SE, England
[3] Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Manchester M15 6PB, England
[4] Deloitte Australia, Brookfield Pl,Tower 2-123 St Georges Terrace, Perth, WA 6000, Australia
关键词
Loan loss provisions; Common ownership; Managerial incentives; Readability; Comparability of financial statements; Private information gathering; Stock liquidity; DISCLOSURE REGULATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; MARKET COMPETITION; INFORMATION; RISK; FIRMS; LIQUIDITY; INVESTORS;
D O I
10.1016/j.bar.2024.101445
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Over 74% of US banks share common ownership with other banks. Our analysis of a large sample of US banks reveals that those with greater common ownership demonstrate heightened transparency. This manifests as reduced discretion in loan loss provisions, improved financial statement readability, and enhanced comparability. We pinpoint three underlying mechanisms: decreased private information gathering, increased stock liquidity, and diminished managerial incentives for opacity. Furthermore, these commonly owned banks exhibit lower crash risk due to their improved transparency. Our findings hold after using various proxies and two endogeneity-reduction methods: a difference-in-differences analysis based on the 2009 Blackrock-Barclays Global Investors merger and an instrumental variable approach using Russell 2000 index inclusions. Overall, our study underscores the positive impact of common ownership in the banking sector.
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页数:29
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