Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty

In this article, I argue that Newman's emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I claim that Wittgenstein, like Newman, challenges both the claim that justification must be neutral and the prejudice according to which any form of persuasion that is not demonstrative is irrational or arational. Arguments are mainly focused on the picture of Newman's epistemology provided lately by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard misrepresents Newman's conception of the illative sense so as to ascribe to him the thesis that religious belief is evidentially grounded in a broad sense of evidence. This creates a false dichotomy between the arational view of religious principles and the account of religious certainties as epistemically grounded. I suggest that Newman's reference to both living persuasion and the role played by the will in religious conviction is part of his attempt to expose this false dichotomy.