Simulation & Manipulation: What Skepticism (Or Its Modern Variation) Teaches Us About Free Will

The chemistry of combining the simulation hypothesis (which many believe to be a modern variation of skepticism) and manipulation arguments will be explored for the first time in this paper. I argue: If we take the possibility that we are now in a simulation seriously enough, then contrary to a common intuition, manipulation very likely does not undermine moral responsibility. To this goal, I first defend the structural isomorphism between simulation and manipulation: Provided such isomorphism, either both of them are compatible with moral responsibility, or none of them is. Later, I propose two kinds of reasons - i.e., the simulator-centric reason and the simulatee-centric reason - for why we have (genuine) moral responsibilities even if we are in a simulation. I close by addressing the significance of this paper in accounting for the relevance of artificial intelligence and its philosophy, in helping resolve a long-locked debate over free will, and in offering one reminder for moral responsibility specialists.