TRIMP: Three-Sided Stable Matching for Distributed Vehicle Sharing System Using Stackelberg Game

被引:0
|
作者
Xu, Yang [1 ]
Zhang, Shanshan [1 ]
Lyu, Chen [2 ]
Liu, Jia [3 ]
Taleb, Tarik [4 ]
Norio, Shiratori [5 ]
机构
[1] Xidian Univ, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Xian 710071, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, MoE Key Lab Interdisciplinary Res Computat & Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Natl Inst Informat, Ctr Strateg Cyber Resilience Res & Dev, Tokyo 1018430, Japan
[4] Ruhr Univ Bochum, D-44801 Bochum, Germany
[5] Chuo Univ, Res & Dev Initiat, Tokyo 1128551, Japan
关键词
Distributed vehicle sharing; pricing; Stackelberg game; three-sided stable matching; ASSIGNMENT; ACCESS;
D O I
10.1109/TMC.2024.3475481
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Distributed Vehicle Sharing System (DVSS) leverages emerging technologies such as blockchain to create a secure, transparent, and efficient platform for sharing vehicles. In such a system, both efficient matching of users with available vehicles and optimal pricing mechanisms play crucial roles in maximizing system revenue. However, most existing schemes utilize user-to-vehicle (two-sided) matching and pricing, which are unrealistic for DVSS due to the lack of participation of service providers. To address this issue, we propose in this paper a novel Three-sided stable Matching with an optimal Pricing (TRIMP) scheme. First, to achieve maximum utilities for all three parties simultaneously, we formulate the optimal policy and pricing problem as a three-stage Stackelberg game and derive its equilibrium points accordingly. Second, relying on these solutions from the Stackelberg game, we construct a three-sided cyclic matching for DVSS. Third, as the existence of such a matching is NP-complete, we design a specific vehicle sharing algorithm to realize stable matching. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our TRIMP scheme, which optimizes the matching process and ensures efficient resource allocation, leading to a more stable and well-functioning decentralized vehicle sharing ecosystem.
引用
收藏
页码:1132 / 1148
页数:17
相关论文
共 17 条
  • [1] Cyclic stable matching for three-sided networking services
    Cui, Lin
    Jia, Weijia
    COMPUTER NETWORKS, 2013, 57 (01) : 351 - 363
  • [2] Cyclic Three-Sided Matching Game Inspired Wireless Network Virtualization
    Raveendran, Neetu
    Gu, Yunan
    Jiang, Chunxiao
    Tran, Nguyen H.
    Pan, Miao
    Song, Lingyang
    Han, Zhu
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, 2021, 20 (02) : 416 - 428
  • [3] Counterexamples of Small Size for Three-Sided Stable Matching with Cyclic Preferences
    Lerner, E. Yu.
    RUSSIAN MATHEMATICS, 2022, 66 (06) : 20 - 27
  • [4] Counterexamples of Small Size for Three-Sided Stable Matching with Cyclic Preferences
    E. Yu. Lerner
    Russian Mathematics, 2022, 66 : 20 - 27
  • [5] Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
    Liwei Zhong
    Yanqin Bai
    Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2019, 37 : 286 - 292
  • [6] Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
    Zhong, Liwei
    Bai, Yanqin
    JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION, 2019, 37 (01) : 286 - 292
  • [7] Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences
    Arenas, Jorge
    Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
    JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION, 2023, 45 (02)
  • [8] Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences
    Jorge Arenas
    Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
    Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2023, 45
  • [9] Minimal instances with no weakly stable matching for three-sided problem with cyclic incomplete preferences
    Lerner, Eduard Yu.
    Lerner, Regina E.
    DISCRETE MATHEMATICS ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS, 2023, 15 (03)
  • [10] Distributed Power Control for Spectrum-Sharing Femtocell Networks Using Stackelberg Game
    Kang, Xin
    Liang, Ying-Chang
    Garg, Hari Krishna
    2011 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC), 2011,