I explore the relevance of reflective equilibrium to aesthetic experience, judgement, and appreciation, framing this project in both descriptive and normative terms. I begin with an exposition of reflective equilibrium, construed as a theory of epistemic justification, and of aesthetic appreciation, characterised as an activity with an epistemic goal-namely, achieving an optimal understanding of an artwork or aesthetic object. I stress the broad purview of reflective equilibrium, as well as Rawls' arguments on the importance of aesthetic activity in human experience, and thus its place in a theory of justice. These preliminary considerations set up a more detailed exploration of reflective equilibrium in action in the aesthetic domain. I develop the argument with reference to a range of cases, from mainstream filmmaking to twelve-tone composition, considering the place of reflective equilibrium in aesthetic appreciation in both its individual and collective guises, as well as its "wide" and "narrow" forms. I demonstrate how the application of reflective equilibrium in the context of the critical appreciation of art relates to a range of significant issues in aesthetics, via the examination of arguments from Sontag, Sibley, Walton, Carroll, and Gaut (among others). Finally I assess various objections to, and extensions of, the main argument, including the objection that aesthetic appreciation does not aim at understanding, and the proposal that the embodied, emotional dimension of aesthetic experience, which must be accommodated by reflective equilibrium in the context of aesthetics, may shed light on its nature and operation in other domains.
