Knowing Your Commitments in Action

An interesting class of intentions is commitments: diachronic intentions that are especially representative of human agency. I argue that the justification conditions for knowing our commitments differ from those for knowing ordinary intentions, and I propose an externalist view according to which knowing one's own commitments is much like knowing those of others. I discuss Sarah Paul's transparency view, according to which, we know our intentions by making a conscious decision, even when we do not follow through on them. This is because, as she argues, the function of decisions and intentions is similar, and changing one's mind in the face of weakness of will does not defeat or undermine that knowledge of intention acquired through a conscious decision. In contrast, I show how the same evidence from weakness of will undermines or outright proves a lack of commitment, as commitments require more than decisions; they demand consistent patterns of action to resist temptations and follow-through over time. Therefore, a conscious decision is not a reliable way to know our commitments in the same way it is for ordinary intentions. I conclude that we cannot justify our commitments merely by referring to a mental item, without also referring to our regular patterns of action.