deposit insurance;
guaranty funds;
market discipline;
regulatory discipline;
BANK RISK-TAKING;
DEPOSIT INSURANCE;
MORAL HAZARD;
FAILURES;
BAILOUTS;
IMPACT;
COST;
D O I:
10.1111/jori.12493
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by exploiting the variation in US state guarantees of property-casualty insurer obligations. We find that guaranty funds have little effect on the risk-sensitivity of insurer financing overall, with the exception of rating changes at the key threshold level of A.M. Best's A- rating. For insurers rated A- before a downgrade, we find that premium growth in business not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in business covered by state guarantees. We estimate this difference in growth to be as high as 14.9% for commercial insurers.
机构:
Renmin Univ China, Chongyang Inst Financial Studies, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaRenmin Univ China, Chongyang Inst Financial Studies, Beijing, Peoples R China
Li, Shanshan
Gong, Di
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Banking & Finance, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaRenmin Univ China, Chongyang Inst Financial Studies, Beijing, Peoples R China
Gong, Di
Lu, Liping
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Renmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Beijing, Peoples R China
Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaRenmin Univ China, Chongyang Inst Financial Studies, Beijing, Peoples R China
机构:
Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaHong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Finance, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China