deposit insurance;
guaranty funds;
market discipline;
regulatory discipline;
BANK RISK-TAKING;
DEPOSIT INSURANCE;
MORAL HAZARD;
FAILURES;
BAILOUTS;
IMPACT;
COST;
D O I:
10.1111/jori.12493
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by exploiting the variation in US state guarantees of property-casualty insurer obligations. We find that guaranty funds have little effect on the risk-sensitivity of insurer financing overall, with the exception of rating changes at the key threshold level of A.M. Best's A- rating. For insurers rated A- before a downgrade, we find that premium growth in business not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in business covered by state guarantees. We estimate this difference in growth to be as high as 14.9% for commercial insurers.
机构:
EDHEC Business Sch, F-06202 Nice, France
World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
World Bank Treasury, 1225 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 USAEDHEC Business Sch, F-06202 Nice, France
机构:
Leonard de Vinci Pole Univ, De Vinci Res Ctr, Paris, France
Prague Univ Econ & Business, Fac Finance & Accounting, Prague, Czech RepublicBanking Acad Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam
Nguyen, Duc Khuong
Nguyen, Trung Duc
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h-index: 0
机构:
Ho Chi Minh Univ Banking, Ho Chi Minh City, VietnamBanking Acad Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam