The Mystery of Intuition in Einstein's Thought Experiments

The role of intuition in understanding in general and in scientific understanding in particular is still very much a subject of a lively philosophical discussion. The role of intuition in thought experimenting is much disputed in its own right, and the arguments range from those that deny any substantial role of intuition in the final inference that the thought experiment is meant to illustrate (eg. Norton or Williamson) to the pivotal role some form of intuition might play (eg. Brown or Mi & scaron;& ccaron;evi & cacute;). So far, mostly Platonists were defenders of intuition, but in his recent book, Mi & scaron;& ccaron;evi & cacute; takes on a formidable task to mount a defense of intuition as seen from a naturalist-evolutionist point of view and within his mentalmodelling approach to thought experiments. I will, while acclaiming certain - and considerable - merits of his approach, nevertheless, insist that certain aspects of intuitive comprehending as it is meant to be going on in the process of thought experimenting remains inexplicable in the naturalist scheme such as Mi & scaron;& ccaron;evi & cacute;'s. The more mysterious (not to say Platonist) aspects of intuition will, hopefully, be revealed through the analyses of the two very famous thought experiments of Einstein which also figure quite importantly in his scientific opus. I will also have something to say about a few related problems as addressed by Mi & scaron;& ccaron;evi & cacute; in his book regarding the description of thought experiment and more general imaginative enactments in thought, as well as on whether there is an essential difference between scientific (primarily physical) and metaphysical thought experiments and other thought experiments or related modes of thinking.