Intrinsic Responsibility for Rule-Following

被引：0
|
作者：
Hlobil, Ulf [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Concordia Univ, Dept Philosophy, 2145 MacKay, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Univ Hradec Kralove, Dept Philosophy, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic
来源：
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY | 2024年
关键词：
Rule-following; Naturalism; Responsibility; Normativity;
D O I：
10.1007/s11245-024-10126-8
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
The paper explores responses to an inconsistent quartet of theses regarding rule-following. In addressing this inconsistent quartet, two lines of thought pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it can seem that rule-following cannot require acts that shape or guide themselves or acts that require infinitely many similar acts. On the other hand, rule-following seems to require that we are responsible for our acts of rule-following in a special way. It is difficult to see how these thoughts can be coherently combined.
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页数：12
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