The social benefits of "anti-social" punishment

被引:1
|
作者
Schlapfer, Alain [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Ctr Democracy Dev & Rule Law, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Cooperation; Reputation; Punishment; Anti-social punishment; Indirect reciprocity; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; STRUCTURAL BALANCE; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; REPUTATION; PROVISION; DYNAMICS; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2025.106655
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Punishment of defectors is believed to be a key factor in sustaining cooperation among unrelated individuals. However, several studies have shown that humans also frequently punish those that act cooperatively, a phenomenon termed anti-social punishment. While subsequent work has suggested reasons why anti-social punishment may be individually optimal, it is universally considered to be detrimental to cooperation and thus indeed "anti-social". This study contradicts this view, showing that punishment of cooperators can be a positive factor in sustaining cooperation rates when used by conditional cooperators against those who cooperate unconditionally. This suggests that judging whether a punitive act is beneficial or detrimental to cooperation is more complex than previously thought.
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页数:7
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