Fictional Reality

被引：0
作者：
Blumberg, Kyle [1 ,2 ]
Holguin, Ben [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Melbourne, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
[2] Univ Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
[3] Johns Hopkins Univ, Baltimore, MD USA
来源：
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW | 2025年 / 134卷 / 02期
关键词：
TRUTH; VAGUENESS; SEMANTICS; WORLDS;
D O I：
10.1215/00318108-11676103
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
This article defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes’s head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what’s true in a work of fiction. This article argues that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. It contrasts this view with one of the dominant approaches to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way it explores the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness. © 2025 by Cornell University.
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收藏
页码：149 / 201
页数：53
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