The deterrence effect of criminal sanctions against environmental crime in Finland: an application of the rational choice model of crime

被引:0
作者
Lindqvist, Riku [1 ]
Lombardini, Chiara [1 ]
Suvantola, Leila
Ollikainen, Markku [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Helsinki, Dept Econ & Managements, Helsinki, Finland
关键词
Deterrence effect; Environmental crime; Finland; Law and economics; Optimal fine; Rational choice model; K14 Criminal Law; K32; Energy; Environmental; Health; and Safety Law; REPUTATIONAL PENALTIES; MONETARY PENALTIES; DECISION-MAKING; ECONOMIC-THEORY; TOXIC RELEASES; PUNISHMENT; ENFORCEMENT; PROSECUTIONS; PERCEPTIONS; VIOLATIONS;
D O I
10.1007/s10657-024-09818-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Applying the rational choice model of crime, this study estimates the optimality of sanctions for environmental crimes, the social cost of these crimes and the expected gain to the offender with Finnish court data from 327 criminal cases in the period 2013-2018. Sensitivity analyses are conducted for the optimal fine, the expected gain from the crime and its social cost. The time-lag and uncertainties related to the restoration of the environmental harm are explicitly included in the model and the empirical analysis. The average fine was much lower than the optimal fine even when taking into account the constraint posed by the offenders' wealth and disregarding the time-lag and uncertainties related to the restoration of the environmental harm. The use of prison sentences was also suboptimal. Even when the illegal gain was fully forfeited, the expected gain from the crime to the offender remained positive. Our results suggest a need to increase the cost of punishment by higher fines and reliable forfeiture of the illegal economic gain. They also point to the importance of systematically estimating both the environmental damage and the illegal gain from the crime as these were available respectively for only 24% (N = 79) and 3% (N = 11) of all cases.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 200
页数:26
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