Is deflationism self-defeating?

被引：0

作者：

Guanglong Luo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Naikai University,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Asian Journal of Philosophy | / 3卷 / 2期

关键词：

Edwards; Deflationism; (In)substantiality; Truth;

D O I：

10.1007/s44204-024-00195-2

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

According to deflationism, truth is insubstantial. Edwards (2018) argues that the deflationist thesis of insubstantiality is incoherent, regardless of how it is characterized. By clarifying the deflationist concepts of reference and truth (and their relations) and addressing the distinction between substantial properties and insubstantial properties within the deflationist framework, we will argue that Edwards’s self-defeating argument is problematic and ultimately unconvincing.

引用