Coalition differential game under uncertainty and stability of the coalition structure

被引：0

作者：

Maksimushkina, E.V. ^{[1
]}

Tarakanov, A.F. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tambov State Pedagogical Univ., Tambov, Russia

来源：

Izvestiya Akademii Nauk. Teoriya i Sistemy Upravleniya | 2004年 / 01期

关键词：

Mathematical models - Optimal control systems - Stability - Uncertain systems;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A dynamic model of a game of two coalitions under uncertainty is constructed. As the solution, a coalition G-guaranteed equilibrium of threats and counterthreats is proposed. It is proposed that, in this equilibrium situation, one coalition has the possibility to win over a player of the other coalition into this coalition. The definitions of threats and counterthreats of coalitions for 'winning over' players are formulated. On the basis of these definitions, the notion of a stable coalition structure is introduced. Some sufficient conditions of the existence of threats and counterthreats in the game of 'winning over' and the stability of the cooperative structure are obtained.

引用

页码：77 / 83