Quantitative Risk Assessment of Cyber-Physical System for Cyber-attacks in Distribution Network

被引：0

作者：

Zhang Y. ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Ni M. ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Sun Y. ^{[3
]}

Li M. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] NARI Group Corporation, State Grid Electric Power Research Institute, Nanjing

[2] State Key Laboratory of Smart Grid Protection and Control, Nanjing

[3] College of Energy and Electrical Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing

来源：

Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems | 2019年 / 43卷 / 21期

基金：

国家重点研发计划; 中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Attack graph; Cyber-attack; Cyber-physical system; Risk assessment;

D O I：

10.7500/AEPS20190401003

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Reliable and safe operation of modern physical power system depends on relevant information system. Cyber-attacks against information system can lead to serious physical consequences. So a quantitative risk assessment method of cyber-physical system for cyber-attack in distribution system across cyber and physical spaces is proposed. According to IEC 61850 standard, a three-tier cyber model is established for slave stations in distribution automation system. The possible attack paths are analyzed to construct attack graph, which regards breaker and sectional switches as attack targets. A Kullback-Leibler (KL)-technique for order preference by similarity to an ideal solution (KL-TOPSIS) system based on relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler distance) and TOPSIS is proposed to quantify the vulnerability factors of cyber systems, and Markov chain and depth-first algorithms are combined to synthetically calculate the attack probability of attack targets. Physical consequence indices of physical devices attacked by cyber are established to calculate the physical consequences after attacking breakers and sectional switches. Combining the physical consequences and attack probability, the cyber-attack risk values of different distribution terminals and substations are obtained. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed risk assessment model is verified by a modified case in distribution system. © 2019 Automation of Electric Power Systems Press.

引用

页码：12 / 22and33

页数：2221

共 30 条

[1]

Zhao J., Wen F., Xue Y., Et al., Cyber physical power systems: architecture, implementation techniques and challenges, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 34, 16, pp. 1-7, (2010)

[2]

Liu D., Sheng W., Wang Y., Et al., Key technologies and trends of cyber physical system for power grid, Proceedings of the CSEE, 35, 14, pp. 3522-3531, (2015)

[3]

Wang Y., Liu D., Lu Y., Research on hybrid system modeling method of cyber physical system for power grid, Proceedings of the CSEE, 36, 6, pp. 1464-1470, (2016)

[4]

Luo A., Xu Q.M., Ma F.J., Et al., Overview of power quality analysis and control technology for smart grid, Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, 4, 1, pp. 1-9, (2016)

[5]

Mei S., Wang Y., Chen L., Overviews and prospects of the cyber security of smart grid from the view of complex network theory, High Voltage Engineering, 37, 3, pp. 672-679, (2011)

[6]

Sundararajan A., Khan T., Moghadasi A., Et al., Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies, Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, 7, 3, pp. 449-467, (2019)

[7]

Tang Y., Wang Q., Ni M., Et al., Analysis of cyber attacks in cyber physical power system, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 40, 6, pp. 148-151, (2016)

[8]

Tang Y., Chen Q., Li M., Et al., Overview on cyber-attacks against cyber physical power system, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 40, 17, pp. 59-69, (2016)

[9]

Su S., Wu C., Ma J., Et al., Attacker's perspective based analysis on cyber attack mode to cyber-physical system, Power System Technology, 38, 11, pp. 3115-3120, (2014)

[10]

Deng R.L., Zhuang P., Liang H., CCPA: coordinated cyber-physical attacks and countermeasures in smart grid, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 8, 5, pp. 2420-2430, (2017)

← 1 2 3 →