Game-theoretic mechanism for cryptographic protocol

Both game theory and secure communication protocols focus on the designing and analyzing mechanisms for parties in a collaborative manner. Yet the two fields developed very different sets of goals and formalisms. This paper studies the secure communication protocol problem in the game-theoretic setting. The goal of this paper is to formulate computation and communication rules of a secure communication protocol based on Nash equilibrium in the game-theoretic framework. We firstly propose a game-theoretic model of secure protocols, including the player set, information set, available action, action sequence, player function, and utility function using the idea from universally composable security. Since our mode combines with the universally composable ideal, secure protocols can be concurrently run within this model. Secondly, the formalized definition of secure protocols is given according to concept of Nash equilibrium. Thirdly, we give an instance of secure protocol under the game-theoretic mechanism. Finally, the analysis shows that our mechanism is effective.