Capability coordination in agricultural products logistics service supply chain with revenue-sharing contract

被引：0
作者：
机构：
[1] School of Automotive and Traffic Engineering, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang
[2] College of Business Administration, Nanchang Institute of Technology, Nanchang
来源：
He, Meiling | 2015年 / Maxwell Science Publications卷 / 08期
关键词：
Agricultural products; Capability coordination; Logistics service supply chain; Revenue-sharing contract;
D O I：
10.19026/ajfst.8.1546
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To solve the capability coordination in logistics service based on the agricultural products industry, a twostage agricultural products Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC) was established with one agricultural products logistics service integrator and one functional logistics service provider. Based on the non-storage property of logistics service capability, the revenue-sharing contract model was built under the uncertain demand. The optimal logistics capability order quantity and the revenue-sharing coefficient were calculated when the agricultural products LSSC achieved coordination. Revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the agricultural products LSSC effectively compared with no contract. A numerical simulation was taken by MATLAB 7.0. The change of purchase price has no influence on the optimal logistics capability order quantity and the expected profit of agricultural products LSSC. It achieves a redistribution of members' profits. With the increases of penalty cost, the optimal logistics capability order quantity and the expected profit of provider increase, while the expected profit of integrator and agricultural products LSSC decrease. © Maxwell Scientific Organization, 2015.
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页码：467 / 471
页数：4
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